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Introduction
The empirically documented fact is that people’s preferences are 
time-biased. The main aim of this paper is to analyse in which sense 
(if any) do time-biases violate the requirements of rationality, as many 
authors assume. I will demonstrate that contrary to many influential 
views in psychology, economy and philosophy it is very difficult to 
find why the bias toward the near violates the requirements of ration-
ality. I will also show why the bias toward the future violates the re-
quirements of rationality in a very basic sense.
We prefer pains to be in the distant future rather than in the im-
mediate future, and pleasures to be in the immediate future rather than 
in the distant future (the bias toward the near). We also prefer pains 
to be in the past rather than in the future and pleasures to be in the 
future rather than in the past (the bias toward the future). On the one 
hand, it can be argued that these phenomena of human psychology 
are similar to some other well-known preferences that are explicable 
in evolutionary terms, e.g. partiality towards immediate kin or partial-
ity towards people living in the same community. If so they could be 
taken into account by normative moral theories and could affect the 
scope of our moral and prudential obligations, in particular the way in 
which we weigh our future interests and well-being against our pre-
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sent interests and well-being. However, on the other hand, it seems 
that some forms of time-biases violate the requirements of rational-
ity. Therefore it can be claimed that we should get rid of these biases 
as irrational when determining the scope of moral or prudential obli-
gations in the intertemporal cases.
The objective of the article is to analyse some of the most im-
portant recent findings in empirical economy and psychology that 
document different kinds of time-biased preferences with the help of 
the analytical tools of philosophy, in particular the recent discussions 
about the nature of the requirements of rationality. I also would like 
to evaluate the possible significance of these empirical findings for 
normative theories. The premise of the article is that moral norms are 
grounded in some features of human nature and reflect the specific hu-
man sensitivity and therefore findings in empirical economy and psy-
chology that document the different kinds of time-biases are impor-
tant for normative theories and can influence the shape and the scope 
of our moral or prudential obligations. 
In the first section I discuss a representative sample of philo-
sophical views on time-biases; in the second I make some clarifica-
tions. The third section analyses different evidence from empirical 
psychology and economy about time-biases; the fourth tries to an-
swer the question of why is it commonly thought that rationality does 
not permit us to be time-biased. In the fifth section I explain how pre-
sent day normative orders (i.e. legal and economic regulations) have 
emerged in the context of different forms of the time-biased prefer-
ences of individuals. 
1. Philosophers on time-biases: Hume, Sidgwick, Rawls, 
Parfit
Many philosophers claim that there is something wrong with prefer-
ences that have no other reason than time. As we will see, some of 
them suggest that these kind of preferences are irrational and that tem-
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poral neutrality is an important requirement of rationality. According 
to many philosophers, temporal neutrality demands that agents at-
tach no significance to the temporal location of goods within some-
one’s life. Despite the apparent novelty of experimental research on 
time biases, the conceptual analysis of this phenomenon is not new. 
The sources of this view can be found in David Hume’s A Treatise on 
Human Nature: 
In reflecting upon any action which I am to perform a twelvemonth 
hence, I always resolve to prefer the greater good, whether at that time 
it will be contiguous or remote. My distance from the final determi-
nation makes all those minute differences vanish, nor am I affected 
by anything, but the general and more discernible qualities of good 
and evil. But on my nearer approach, those circumstances, which I at 
first over-looked, begin to appear, and have an influence on my con-
duct and affections. A new inclination to the present good springs up, 
and makes it difficult for me to adhere inflexibly to my first purpose 
and resolution.1 
In this chapter of A treatise… Hume discusses in which way peo-
ple are governed by their own interests. Although in the first sentence 
of this chapter he claims: “Nothing is more certain, than that men are, 
in a great measure, governed by interest”, he also tries to understand 
why people sometimes violate the rule of self-interest. He maintains 
that if they reflect from a temporal distance they govern themselves 
only by the real qualities of things and the gains they can expect from 
them. He assumes that value judgments made from a temporal dis-
tance are more reliable, whereas when “an inclination to the present 
good” appears, their judgments very often become disturbed. Hume 
calls this bias toward the near “natural weakness” or “natural infir-
mity”. 
1 D. Hume, A treatise of human nature, Courier Dover Publications, New York 2003 
(1739), III, II, 7.
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Adam Smith had similar views on time-biases and he claimed that 
temporal neutrality is a normative requirement of prudence which de-
mands an equal concern for all parts of life. 
The impartial spectator does not feel himself worn out by the present 
labour of those whose conduct he surveys; nor does he feel himself so-
licited by the importunate calls of their present appetites. To him their 
present, and what is likely to be their future situation, are very nearly 
the same: he sees them nearly at the same distance, and is affected by 
them very nearly in the same manner.2 
“The impartial spectator” is an ideal impartial person who fully 
empathizes with the emotions and actions of “normal” people. Smith 
assumed – as many philosophers before him – that the soul is com-
posed of two different faculties or orders (“the faculty by which we 
judge of truth and falsehood” and “passions and appetites which are 
so apt to rebel against their master”). This lower faculty (“inferior and 
brutal appetites”) is responsible for time-biases, which result from 
cognitive limitations or the weakness of will. It is why the impartial 
spectator, who can be understood also as a metaphor for the higher 
faculty, does not manifest time-biases (“to him their present, and what 
is likely to be their future situation, are very nearly the same”). Both 
Hume and Smith maintain that it is impossible to correct these lower 
inclinations, because it is impossible “to change or correct anything 
material in our nature” (Hume). The only way to restraint them is to 
use some contrary impulses and the mild paternalism, that corrects 
human value judgments.3 
Henry Sidgwick in The Methods of Ethics defended a similar 
view, but he took one step further claiming that the location of some 
experience in time within a single human life is not relevant: 
2 A. Smith, The theory of moral sentiments, Penguin, London 2010 (1759/2010), VI, 
I, 11
3 I. Palacios-Huerta, “Time-inconsistent preferences in Adam Smith and David Hume”, 
History of Political Economy 35(2) (2003), pp. 241–268.
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[P]roximity is a property that it’s reasonable to disregard except in its 
effect on uncertainty. My feelings next year should be just as impor-
tant to me as my feelings next minute, if only I could be equally sure 
of what they will be. This impartial concern for all the temporal parts 
of one’s conscious life is a prominent element in the common notion 
of the rational as opposed to the impulsive pursuit of pleasure.4 
Sidgwick assumes that the moment in time in which particular 
feelings exist is no reason to prefer one of them over another. There 
are no reasons to care more about one part of my life than to care 
about any other. Moreover, temporal neutrality is an important ele-
ment of the rational pursuit of pleasure. He writes: “[T]he mere dif-
ference of priority and posteriority in time is not a reasonable ground 
for having more regard to the consciousness of one moment that to 
that of another”.5 He also holds that the good of one person consists 
in the aggregation of the different goods of each moment as they fol-
low one another in time. Similarly, the universal good is constructed 
by the comparison and integration of the good of many different in-
dividuals. 
It seems, however, clear that the time at which a man exists cannot af-
fect the value of his happiness from a universal point of view; and that 
the interests of posterity must concern a Utilitarian as much as those 
of his contemporaries, except in so far as the effect of his actions on 
posterity – and even the existence of human beings to be affected – 
must necessarily be more uncertain.6 
Nevertheless, he claims that there is an important factor that can 
influence preferences both in individual and collective cases: the un-
certainty of the effects “on posterity”. Yet when there is no uncer-
4 H. Sidgwick, The methods of ethics, Hackett Publishing, London 1907, II, 2, 1.
5 Ibidem, III, 13, 3.
6 Ibidem, IV, 1, 2.
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tainty, we should not be affected by the time-biases which are not 
“reasonable” and which do not suit the rational “pursuit of pleasures”.
John Rawls in A Theory of Justice accepted Sidgwick’s view and 
explored the connection between time-neutral preferences and ration-
ality: 
In the case of an individual the avoidance of pure time preference is a 
feature of being rational. As Sidgwick maintains, rationality implies an 
impartial concern for all parts of our life. The mere difference of loca-
tion in time, of something’s being earlier or later, is not in itself a ra-
tional ground for having more or less regard for it. Of course, a pre-
sent or near future advantage may be counted more heavily on account 
of its greater certainty or probability, and we should take into consid-
eration how our situation and capacity for particular enjoyments will 
change. But none of these things justifies our preferring a lesser present 
to a greater future good simply because of its nearer temporal position.7 
And then he is even more radical: 
Mere temporal position, or distance from the present, is not a reason 
for favoring one moment over another. Future aims may not be dis-
counted solely in virtue of being future, although we may, of course, 
ascribe less weight to them if there are reasons for thinking that, given 
their relation to other things, their fulfillment is less probable. The in-
trinsic importance that we assign to different parts of our life should be 
the same at every moment of time. These values should depend upon 
the whole plan itself as far as we can determine it and should not be 
affected by the contingencies of our present perspective.8 
In those two fragments Rawls presents very strong views on the 
irrationality of time-biases. First of all, he claims that “rationality im-
7 J. Rawls, A theory of justice, Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA 1999 p. 259.
8 Ibidem, p. 369.
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plies an impartial concern for all parts of our life”. He assumes that 
maximizing values during someone’s lifespan is the requirement of 
rationality. Therefore the mere location in time of some value is not “a 
rational ground” for preferring some value. In the second quotation he 
repeats this view in a slightly modified form. He claims that temporal 
position of some value is not a reason for favouring this value in one 
moment over another. It also seems that he treats as one the require-
ments of rationality and “being a reason for favouring something”. 
The longest and the most sophisticated discussion about the ra-
tionality of time-biases can be found in Derek Parfit’s Reasons and 
Persons. At the beginning of chapter 8 he asks the following question: 
“On the Desire-Fulfilment Theory, should I give equal weight to all 
of my desires, past, present, and future?” According to the Self-inter-
est Theory and Desire-Fulfilment Theory, which are the subject of his 
criticism in the first chapters of Reasons and Persons, the strongest 
reasons speak in favour of these actions which lead to the fullest ful-
filment of someone’s desires, no matter how they are situated in time. 
But, Parfit argues, it cannot be true. 
Firstly, regarding past desires, he proposes the following thought 
experiment: let us assume that for fifty years someone has two strong-
est desires: trying to ensure that Venice will be saved and being one of 
its saviours. Yet after 50 years this person ceases to have these desires. 
Does he still have a reason to contribute to the Venice Fund? If we as-
sumed total time-neutrality, we should answer positively to this ques-
tion, because acting in this way this person could help to fulfil two of 
his past desires. Although he no longer has these desires, they were 
his strongest desires for fifty years and he will not have any other so 
strong and so long-lasting. So it would be irrational to cease to con-
tribute even though he do not now have, and shall never later have, 
any desire to contribute but this solution seems awkward.
Secondly, regarding the future desires that depend on value judg-
ments, Parfit quotes the well-known principle: we cannot honestly 
claim that q is true, but not believing in q. Let us imagine that in a 
particular moment in time someone comes to the conclusion that in 
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the future his desires that depend on value judgments will change: he 
will stop believing that q and he will start believing that not-q. Again, 
if we assumed total time-neutrality, this man would have to give the 
same weight to his present and his predicted future values. This would 
be giving the same weight to what he now believes to be justified and 
to what he now believes to be worthless and this is clearly irrational 
– as Parfit writes. It is impossible to believe that q is true and in the 
same time be neutral towards this q. If someone believes that some of 
his later beliefs will be better justified, he should have this belief now. 
Parfit concludes that “a rational agent must give priority to the values 
or ideals that he now accepts” over those which accepted in the past 
or will be accepted in the future.
The next problem related to time-biases that Parfit discusses is a 
distinction between two phenomena. The first is the bias towards the 
near, the second is the bias towards the future. This first phenomenon 
was partially noticed by Hume in the quotation I have discussed: we 
have an inclination to the present goods or, in other words, we dis-
count the value of future goods. This second phenomenon is described 
by Parfit in the following way: “The thought of such events affects us 
more when they are in the future rather than the past. Looking forward 
to a pleasure is, in general, more pleasant than looking back upon it. 
And in the case of pains the difference is even greater.” (Parfit, 1984, 
160) Some preferences or behaviours that seem to be incoherent with 
the first phenomenon can be explained by the second. For example, 
we sometimes bring pains into the nearer future, and postpone pleas-
ures. The second phenomenon can explain this easily: we may want 
to get the pains behind us and to keep the pleasures before us. Parfit 
suggests that there is something wrong with this these two biases. Al-
though his views on the bias toward the future are not always very 
clear, his views on the bias toward the near are explicitly critical: 
But on all plausible theories one point is agreed. When we are decid-
ing what is in someone’s interests, we should discount for uncertainty, 
but not for mere remoteness. We should not give less weight to this 
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person’s further future, or give greater weight to his present desires… 
We should give equal weight to all the parts of this person’s life.9 
It is not clear what is a nature of this requirement of “equal weight 
to all the parts of someone’s life”. It can be guessed that it is neither 
the requirement of morality, nor the requirement of rationality (under-
stood as a mere coherence of attitudes), but the requirement of pru-
dence: it is in everybody’s interests not to have it. 
It is quite difficult to deduce what is Parfit’s view about the bias 
towards the future (ultimately he seems to be neutral regarding its ir-
rationality). On the one hand, he claims that the bias toward the fu-
ture is sometimes profitable for us and sometimes not: 
Our bias towards the future is bad for us. It would be better for us if we 
were like Timeless. We would lose in certain ways. Thus we should 
not be relieved when bad things were in the past. But we should also 
gain. We should not be sad when good things were in the past.10 
On the other hand, Parfit finally suggests that it would be better 
for us if we were like Timeless, that is someone who experiences past 
harms which are just as strong as those that will follow. Why? He pre-
sents two arguments that show that, taking everything into account, 
the bias toward the future is not beneficial for us. The first refers to 
the mechanisms of memory. 
When we look backward, we could afford to be selective. We ought to 
remember some of the bad events in our lives, when this would help 
us to avoid repetitions. But we could allow ourselves to forget most 
of the bad things that have happened, while preserving by rehearsing 
all of our memories of the good things.11
9 D. Parfit, Reasons and persons, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1984, p. 162.
10 Ibidem, p. 174.
11 Ibidem.
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Parfit’s second argument for preferring neutrality is related to the 
more calm attitude toward death we might acquire if we got rid of the 
bias toward the future. As we age, we have less and less to look for-
ward to and this is why we fear death. Of course, as we age we also 
have more and more to look back upon but, because of our bias, that 
fact does not compensate for our having less of a future to look to-
ward. If we didn’t have our bias, we could enjoy looking back at our 
past as much as we enjoy looking toward the future now, and hence 
we would not fear death.
Now suppose that our lives have nearly passed. We shall die tomor-
row. If we were not biased towards the future, our reaction should mir-
ror the one that I have just described. We should not be greatly tro-
ubled by the thought that we shall soon cease to exist, for though we 
now have nothing to look forward to, we have our whole lives to look 
backward to.12
So, on the one hand, Parfit presents arguments in favour of the 
view that the bias towards the future is not beneficial for us, but on 
the other he presents in the widely discussed example of a hospital 
which is designed to demonstrate that this bias is very common and, 
moreover, it seems to be justified and those lacking it would seem 
irrational. 
I am in some hospital, to have some kind of surgery. Since this is com-
pletely safe, and always successful, I have no fears about the effects. 
The surgery may be brief, or it may instead take a long time. Because 
I have to co-operate with the surgeon, I cannot have anaesthetics. I 
have had this surgery once before, and I can remember how painful 
it is. Under a new policy, because the operation is so painful, patients 
are now afterwards made to forget it. Some drug removes their me-
mories of the last few hours.
12 Ibidem. p. 176.
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I have just woken up. I cannot remember going to sleep… I may be 
the patient who had his operation yesterday. In that case, my operation 
was the longest ever performed, lasting ten hours. I may instead be 
the patient who is to have a short operation later today. It is either true 
that I did suffer for ten hours, or true that I shall suffer for one hour…
[I]t is clear to me which I prefer to be true. If I learn that the first is 
true, I shall be greatly relieved.13
The problem Parift noticed here is a reversal of time preferences: 
it seems that before the operation every rational agent should prefer 
the later, much shorter operation. But if you have just woken up and 
you are not sure whether you had the operation or not, the desire to 
be after the operation seems to be completely justified. Moreover, this 
bias revealed in this moment at first sight seems to be a paradigm of 
rational attitude, we would not regard the person without this bias as 
“normal”.14
Nevertheless, the general view which emerges from these classi-
cal texts is that a rational person will be temporally neutral and will 
assign no independent significance to the temporal location of goods 
and harms within his life. In the next section I will clarify some issues 
related to the time-biases.
2. Clarifications
The most important clarification concerns the very notion of time-
bias preferences. The kind of preferences I am interested in are called 
“the pure time preferences” and refer solely to the psychological ef-
fects with respect to remoteness in time. They could be defined (with 
regard to the bias toward the near) as follows “I prefer to have X to-
13 Ibidem, p. 165.
14 D. Moller, “Parfit on pains, pleasures, and the time of their occurrence”, Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy 32(1) (2002), pp. 67–82.
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day rather than having X at some point in the future, for no other rea-
son than the fact that I dislike waiting”.15 According to another defi-
nition, a pure time preference is “a preference for something to come 
at one point in time rather than another, not because this will make 
the benefit greater or more certain, but merely because of when it oc-
curs in time”.16 
The mere possibility of separating pure time preference – both in 
empirical research or in conceptual analyses – from other factors un-
derlying time preferences can be questioned. Many preferences that 
seem to be based solely on time do not involve time-biases in my 
sense. For example you can prefer to be rich now than in 30 years be-
cause you will have more time to enjoy your fortune. In such cases 
preferences are not time-biased because it is clear that the mere loca-
tion in time of the same event (becoming rich) can result in different 
gains. Therefore it is not the mere difference of location in time that 
makes you prefer to be rich today, but the fact that you will gain more 
if you receive the wealth earlier.
Probably the most important is “the uncertainty effect” visible 
in the quotations from Sidgwick and Rawls: given the uncertainty of 
many future events, in many cases it is reasonable to attribute less 
value to future outcomes than to immediate ones. The uncertainty 
does not have to be limited to the results of our actions. We also can-
not be certain in which way we will value these outcomes. For exam-
ple I can prefer go skiing now than in 30 years not because of a pure 
time preference, but because I am not sure whether I will enjoy ski-
ing when I am in my sixties.
The other important clarification concerns the distinction be-
tween inter-temporal and intergenerational issues. In this paper I am 
interested mostly in the rationality of the preferences of an individ-
ual on her own behalf (the exception is the last section where I dis-
15 G. Tinghög, “Discounting, preferences, and paternalism in cost-effectiveness analy-
sis”, Health Care Analysis 20(3) (2012), p. 302.
16 R. Lowry, M. Peterson, “Pure time preference”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 
92(4) (2011), p. 490.
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cuss the problem of in which way some present normative orders, 
like legal regulations, have emerged in the context of time-biased 
preferences). 
The next problem, closely related to the previous one, is a dis-
tinction between the criteria of individual and collective actions. I 
will only deal with a problem of the inter-temporal allocation of val-
ues within someone’s life and not with the allocation of values be-
tween different individuals separated by time. It is worth noting that 
that many discussions by philosophers or economists concern not 
the individual decisions about the distribution of goods within some-
one’s life, but policy-makers who must decide in which way to dis-
tribute goods among different generations of people. Much of the 
disagreement about discounting, in particular between economists 
and philosophers, seems to originate from the lack of recognition of 
this distinction.17 It was visible for example in the quotation by Sidg-
wick, where he claims that “the interests of posterity must concern 
a Utilitarian as much as those of his contemporaries”. Sidgwick (but 
also Rawls) seemed to use these two interchangeably: he held that if 
individual time biases are irrational, the same must be said about pol-
icy makers who must not prefer the interests of present people over 
the interests of future people only because of the time of their exist-
ence. Of course there is no easy way from inter-temporal to inter-
generational issues, although the individual tendencies to care more 
about the near is often considered to be a reason to place less value 
on future generations. 
In the final section I will discuss briefly whether behavioural ef-
fects related to time preferences tested empirically provide any reason 
for society to favour (or not) the present over the future when making 
intergenerational choices. The initial objections would say that indi-
vidual discounting does not imply social discounting: someone may 
discount his own future heavily, but in the same time be deeply con-
17 G. Brennan, “Discounting the future, yet again”, Politics, Philosophy & Economics 
6(3) (2007), pp. 259–284.
162 Tomasz Żuradzki
cerned about the welfare of distant generations, and favouring some 
social policies.18
The important factor in discounting future goods is growth and 
diminishing marginal utility: it is assumed that the utility derived from 
a unit of good will decrease as the amount of this good increases (if 
there is more of some good, an individual derives from a given unit 
of that good less utility). The value of 2000 PLN is much higher for 
a person who earns this amount during one month than for a person 
who earns it in one day. So, if an individual expects that he will have 
more goods in the future, he can reasonably place a higher value on 
present goods, because this is growth and not pure time preference. 
It is easy to notice that different categories of things can be dis-
counted: commodities, wellbeing, health. It was noticed that this 
could also be a reason why different authors have different views on 
discounting. For example, John Broome observed: 
Economists typically discount the sorts of goods that are bought and 
sold in markets, which I shall call commodities. Philosophers are typi-
cally thinking of a more fundamental good, people’s wellbeing. There 
are sound reasons to discount most commodities, and there may well 
be sound reasons not to discount wellbeing. It is perfectly consistent 
to discount commodities and not wellbeing.19 
He claims that it makes sense to employ a discount rate (proba-
bly even within one life) for commodities because the price of most 
them falls over time either because we can produce them in a more 
efficient way or because natural resources grow naturally or because 
we will be able to buy more because of the positive return from in-
vestments. But according to Broome there is no reason to discount 
our own future wellbeing. 
18 S. Frederick, “Valuing future life and future lives: A framework for understanding 
discounting”, Journal of Economic Psychology 27(5) (2006), pp. 667–680.
19 J. Broome, “Discounting the future”, Philosophy & Public Affairs 23(2) (1994), 
p. 144.
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One can also argue that the concept of personal identity, especially 
the link that connects a person in one time period with the same person 
in a later period, can influence the rate of discounting. For example, I 
am now closely connected with “myself” on the next day, but the psy-
chological link that is guaranteed by memory and other processes, be-
tween me now and me in 30 years time is much weaker. I partially treat 
this future me as a different person, and I do not treat his potential future 
experiences as mine. The implication of this argument would be that 
some degree of short-sighted pure time preference would be rational if 
individuals become less psychologically attached to their future selves. 
Finally, some authors have argued that the time at which goods 
occur can affect the narrative structure of a person’s life. They claim 
that the contribution of an individual action, event, or experience to 
well-being depends not only on its intrinsic properties, but also on 
what has gone on before and what will go on to happen. For exam-
ple, one can believe that a life that begins badly but improves is bet-
ter than a life that begins brilliantly, but deteriorates. So he can prefer 
to receive some achievements later rather than earlier, not because of 
some strange reversed bias toward the near, but because of his views 
about the structure of a good life.20
In this section I have distinguished pure time preferences (either 
in a form of a bias toward the near or in the form of bias toward the 
future) from other factors that can influence our time preferences, like 
the probability of future events, diminishing marginal utility, the kind 
of goods that are vulnerable to time-biased preferences, connectedness 
with my future self, the narrative structure of life. I have also deline-
ated the problem I am interested in (the inter-temporal decisions of an 
individual) from three other problems: the inter-temporal decisions of 
policy makers, the intergenerational decisions of individual, the inter-
generational decisions of policy makers. In the next section I will re-
view briefly the most important empirical findings about time-biases. 
20 J.D. Velleman, “Well-being and time”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72(1) (1991), 
pp. 48–77.
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3. The anomalies of time-biases 
Evidences from empirical psychology and economy suggest that in 
making intertemporal choices people discount future values. These 
results were obtained both from field studies (preferences were in-
ferred from the economic decisions that people make in their real 
lives) and from experimental studies (people were asked to evaluate 
intertemporal prospects with hypothetical outcomes). 
The most important and widely confirmed feature of time pref-
erences is the fact that people discount future values and their dis-
count rates are usually not constant over time (that is discounting 
is not exponential), but decline in the form of a hyperbolic dis-
counting function. When subjects are asked to compare smaller but 
sooner rewards to larger but later ones, the discount rate over longer 
time horizons that was inferred from their behaviour was lower than 
the implicit discount rate over shorter time horizons. For exam-
ple, the behavioural surveys show that most of us would prefer 110 
PLN in 31 days over 100 PLN in 30 days, but also prefer 100 PLN 
now over 110 PLN tomorrow (it is also assumed that such prefer-
ence reversals would also hold if subjects who currently prefer 110 
PLN in 31 days over 100 PLN in 30 days were asked again thirty 
days later, they would prefer 100 PLN at that time over 110 PLN 
one day later). This is the best documented phenomenon which im-
plies that different discount rates are used to evaluate close and far 
away goods. In one well-known survey, subjects were asked how 
much money they would require in one month or one year or ten 
years to make them indifferent to receiving 15 USD now. The me-
dian responses (20 USD / 50 USD / 100 USD) demonstrated an av-
erage annual discount rate of “345 percent over a one-month ho-
rizon, 120 percent over a one-year horizon, and 19 percent over a 
ten-year horizon”.21 
21 R. Thaler, “Some empirical evidence on dynamic inconsistency”, Economics Letters 
8(3) (1981), pp. 201–207.
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This pattern is characteristic not only of humans: pigeons have 
also had to choose between a smaller-sooner reward and a larger-later 
reward (food). When the smaller reward was available after 28 sec-
onds and the larger after 32 seconds, all the pigeons strongly preferred 
the larger reward. However, when the smaller reward was available 
after 2 seconds and the larger after 6 seconds, all the pigeons over-
whelmingly preferred the smaller reward.22
Nevertheless there are some important reservations to these seem-
ingly clear views on discount rates that are revealed in behaviour. 
Firstly, when we exclude studies with very short time horizons (less 
than one year) there is no behavioural evidence that the discount rate 
declines. Secondly, there is great variability in the estimates based on 
behavioural surveys (the implicit annual discount rates range from –6 
percent to infinity). Thirdly, in contrast to estimates of physical phe-
nomena, there is no evidence of methodological progress; the range 
of estimates does not shrink over time. 
3.1. Some anomalies of the bias toward the near
The hyperbolic discounting is not the only regularity tested in an em-
pirical way. There are also a few other characteristic patterns.23 Firstly, 
gains are discounted more than losses (“the sign effect”). For ex-
ample, subjects were asked to imagine they had received a traffic 
ticket that could be paid either now or later and to state how much 
they would be willing to pay if payment could be delayed (by three 
months, one year, or three years). The discount rates imputed from 
these answers were much lower than the discount rates imputed from 
comparable questions about monetary gains.24
22 L. Green, E. Fisher, S. Perlow, L. Sherman, “Preference reversal and self control: 
Choice as a function of reward amount and delay”, Behaviour Analysis Letters 1 
(1981), pp. 43–51.
23 S. Frederick, G. Loewenstein, T. O'Donoghue, “Time discounting and time prefe-
rence: A critical review”, Journal of Economic Literature 40(2) (2002), pp. 351–401.
24 R. Thaler, “Some empirical evidence...”, op. cit.
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Secondly, smaller amounts are discounted more than larger 
amounts (“the magnitude effect”). In one study, for example, respond-
ents were, on average, indifferent between $15 immediately and $60 
in a year, $250 immediately and $350 in a year, and $3000 immedi-
ately and $4000 in a year, implying discount rates of 139 percent, 34 
percent, and 29 percent, respectively.25
Thirdly, “greater discounting is shown to avoid delay of a good 
than to expedite its receipt” (“the delay-speedup asymmetry”).26 It 
was demonstrated that imputed discount rates can be affected by 
whether the change in the delivery schedule of an outcome is pre-
sented as an acceleration or a delay. For example, respondents who 
didn’t expect to receive a good for another year would pay much less 
to receive it immediately, in comparison to those who thought they 
would receive it immediately demanded much more money to accept 
a delay in its receipt by a year.27 
Fourthly, in choices over sequences of outcomes, improving se-
quences are often preferred to declining sequences although posi-
tive time preference dictates the opposite (“preference for improv-
ing sequences”). For example in one study it was found that, for 
an otherwise identical job, most subjects prefer an increasing wage 
profile (i.e. improving sequence) to a declining or flat one.28 This is 
surprising since the economic calculus suggests that it should be the 
other way round: it is better to earn more earlier, and less later, be-
cause you can invest money and exploit interest rates. Other stud-
ies found an even more surprising effect: increasing salary sequence 
was rated as highly as a decreasing sequence that earn subjects much 
more money. Daniel Kahneman, in a series of well-known studies, 
found that subjects strongly preferred decreasing discomfort (pain) 
25 Ibidem.
26 S. Frederick, et al., “Time discounting and time preference...”, op. cit.
27 G.F. Loewenstein, “Frames of mind in intertemporal choice”, Management Science 
34(2) (1988), pp. 200–214.
28 G. Loewenstein, N. Sicherman, “Do workers prefer increasing wage profiles?”, Jo-
urnal of Labor Economics 9(1) (1991), pp. 67–84.
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to increasing discomfort, even when the decreasing discomfort last 
longer.29 
Fifthly, in choices over sequences people have a preference for 
spreading consumption over time (“preference for spread”). In one ex-
periment subjects were asked to imagine that they were given two cou-
pons for restaurant dinners, and were asked to determine when they 
would use them. Subjects were either told that “you can use the cou-
pons at any time between today and two years from today” or were told 
nothing about any constraints. Subjects who faced the two-year con-
straint scheduled both dinners at a later time than those who had no 
constraints. This second group delayed the first dinner for eight weeks 
(rather than three) and the second dinner for 31 weeks (rather than thir-
teen). This counterintuitive result can be explained in terms of a pref-
erence for spread if the explicit two-year interval was greater than the 
implicit time horizon of subjects in the unconstrained group.30
3.2. The bias toward the future
In contrast to the bias toward the near, the bias toward the future was 
hardly tested empirically. Probably there is only one experiment ex-
plicitly aimed at investigating this bias and testing the hypothesis 
that people place a greater value on events in the future than in the 
past.31 Subjects in this experiment read pairs of stories describing two 
events, one of which occurred in the future and one of which occurred 
in the past (the distance from the present was the same in both cases). 
In the first of the five experiments, subjects were asked to imagine that 
they would spend (or had spent) five hours on work one month in the 
future (or one month in the past) and to indicate how much money 
29 D. Kahneman, B.L. Fredrickson, C.A. Schreiber, D.A. Redelmeier, “When more 
pain is preferred to less: Adding a better end”, Psychological Science 4(6) (1993), pp. 
401–405.
30 G.F. Loewenstein, D. Prelec, “Preferences for sequences of outcomes”, Psychologi-
cal Review 100(1) (1993), pp. 91–108.
31 E.M. Caruso, D.T. Gilbert, T.D. Wilson, “A wrinkle in time asymmetric valuation of 
past and future events”, Psychological Science 19(8) (2008), pp. 796–801.
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they thought would be fair compensation for their work. Subjects re-
sponded that they wanted to receive twice as much money for per-
forming the task in the future as in the past.
The researchers assumed that the subjects’ valuation of the past 
and the future may be related to differences in their affective re-
sponses. To test this, subjects were asked to imagine that they had 
agreed to help their neighbour move out of his apartment (either they 
helped the neighbour move one week in the past and one in which 
they would help him one week in the future). The story stipulated that 
the neighbour would afterwards give him a voucher for a bottle of 
wine. Subjects asked to imagine helping the neighbour in the future 
chose a bottle of wine that was 38 percent more expensive than the 
bottle of wine they selected when given the past version of the story. 
Moreover, subjects who imagined helping their neighbour move in 
the future felt significantly more tired, stressed, and dreadful than sub-
jects who imagined helping the neighbour in the past.
This study is important but the problem is that empirical research 
on this time-bias is limited, so firstly, these results have not been 
checked, secondly, there are probably many other important phenom-
ena related to this kind of bias. For example, Caspar Hare32 suggested 
(it was an armchair philosophy intuition) that future bias can be se-
lective: we are not future-biased with respect to things that we take 
to be bad for us but badness is not related to having bad experiences. 
He assumes that in this case we would not care about whether the bad 
event was in the immediate past or the immediate future (I will return 
to this problem in the section 4.1).
3.3. The interpretation of these results
One of the most surprising results of experiments of time-biases is the 
fact that very often people do not treat them as errors. This is in con-
32 C. Hare, “A puzzle about other-directed time-bias”, Australasian Journal of Philo-
sophy 86(2) (2008), pp. 269–277.
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trast with the effects documented in other domains of judgments and 
choice. For example, in the famous conjunction fallacy described by 
Kahneman and Tversky, most subjects were able to recognize their 
initial mistakes when the nature of the experiment was explained to 
them (e.g., that it cannot be more likely for a woman to be a femi-
nist bank teller than just a bank teller). But regarding the preferences 
for improving sequences, subjects were quite reluctant to abandon 
their preferences even when the nature of the experiment has been 
explained to them (that a decreasing wage profile would permit more 
consumption in every period than the corresponding increasing wage 
profile). In many experiments the respondents did not attempt to co-
ordinate their responses, suggesting that they had not considered the 
different discount rates as something wrong. For example, the mag-
nitude effect is more clearly visible when respondents evaluated both 
small and large amounts than when they evaluate one of those. The 
same results were obtained with the sign effect where discount rates 
were larger if subjects evaluated both delayed gains and delayed loses 
than when they evaluated either one. 
This feature of time-biases shows that these preferences (or at least 
not all of them) belong to no standard category of preference failures. 
On the one hand, they do not belong to myopic failures which relate to a 
cognitive inability to compute information adequately to make choices 
that maximize the wellbeing of an individual. These failures refer to 
cases where there are difficult to predict outcomes, where the quantity 
of information is great to assess it properly, or where individuals are 
not able to interpret and calculate the implications of certain statistical 
or probabilistic situations.33 In these cases respondents are able to rec-
ognize their own mistakes. On the other hand, time-biases do not be-
long to acratic failures which relate to situations in which individuals 
are not able to control their own preferences effectively and act against 
their own better judgment. When making acratic failures people’s judg-
33 A. Tversky, D. Kahneman, “The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice”, 
Science 211(4481) (1981), pp. 453–458.
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ments are different from the course of action they choose. So it is also 
not a case of at least many time-biased preferences, because in this case 
there is no inconsistency between judgments and choices. 
4. Time-biases and the requirements of rationality
In this section I will analyse time-biases with the help of the analyti-
cal tools of recent philosophy. I try to do so in light of the recent dis-
cussions on the nature of the requirements of rationality and to eval-
uate the possible significance of the empirical findings for normative 
moral theories. The general question of this part is normative: should 
we think that rationality does not permit us to prefer receiving some 
value in one part of one’s life over receiving the same number of units 
of value in another part of one’s life? 
The simple answer seems to be that rationality requires the maxi-
mization of our values, no matter where or when they exist or will ex-
ist. And this is the reason why time-biases are irrational: they interfere 
with this aim. Therefore it might seem that if we want to act ration-
ally we should decide as if from a universal point of view, from which 
the time at which values exist does not matter. This kind of norma-
tive answer is characteristic mainly for the utilitarian perspective (im-
plemented implicitly in some economic analyses that are conducted 
in terms of cost-benefit analysis or in many evaluative judgments 
by psychologists), which assumes that the goodness of outcomes is 
measured by the total utility resulting from the actions, irrespective 
of who gets the utility and when. According to this normative posi-
tion we should act in such a way despite the fact that we have strong 
psychological inclinations to do otherwise. 
4.1. Time-biases and rationality as the coherence of attitudes
The preference to receive some intrinsic value in one part of one’s 
life over the same number of units of intrinsic value in another part 
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of one’s life might be just a matter of taste, and as such it could be 
beyond being rational or irrational. In this understanding, if only 
an agent’s set of preferences is consistent he is rational. This un-
derstanding of normativity is related to an attitude-dependent con-
ceptions of reasons, where there are no facts about how an agent 
has the most normative reason to do that are valid independently of 
that agent’s evaluative attitudes.34 Therefore the only failures of ra-
tionality are failures to have a coherent system of beliefs and inten-
tions. For example, we can enumerate the following requirements of 
rationality:35
1)  Rationality requires of you that you do not both believe p and be-
lieve not-p.
2)  Rationality requires of you that, if you believe p and you believe 
(if p then q), and if it matters to you whether q, then you believe 
q.
3)  Rationality requires of you that, if you intend to G, and if you be-
lieve your Fing is a necessary means to your Ging, and if you be-
lieve you will not F unless you intend to F, then you intend to F.
4)  Rationality requires of you that, if you believe you ought to F, and 
if you believe you will not F unless you intend to F, then you in-
tend to F. 
In this paradigm we are also irrational if we violate the basic axi-
oms of decision theory (completeness, independence, continuity, tran-
sitivity): for example we assign a lower degree of probability to the 
occurrence of event A than A and some distinct event B (like in Kah-
neman’s case of a bank-teller), or we are irrational if we prefer straw-
berry ice-cream to blueberry ice-cream, blueberry to blackberry and 
blackberry to strawberry. To the extent that a person’s judgments and 
decisions accord with formal logic and the standard axioms of deci-
sion theory, they are rational. 
34 S. Street, “In defense of future Tuesday indifference: Ideally coherent eccentrics 
and the contingency of what matters”, Philosophical Issues 19(1) (2009), pp. 273–298.
35 The list is inspired by: J. Broome, “Does rationality give us reasons?”, Philosophical 
Issues 15(1) (2005), pp. 321–337.
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Of course, even within this paradigm some time-biases could be 
treated as irrational and they could be understood in a similar fashion 
to akrasia: we would be irrational when the time-biases revealed by 
our motivations fails to match the judgments we make about correct 
structure of time preferences. For example, if you believe that you 
should not discount the value of your future health, but you do not in-
tend to change some habits that demonstrate that in fact you do dis-
count your health, you would be irrational. The problem is that em-
pirical evidence suggests that it is not the case that time-preferences 
do not match value judgments. Most people think that their time-bi-
ases are perfectly justified.
So should we accept that: “The mere fact that you prefer to con-
sume something now rather than in the future, for no other reason than 
time itself, need not violate any of the internal properties of rational-
ity researched in decision theory”?36 I will demonstrate that this is in-
deed true in the case of future bias, but does not have to be true in the 
case of the bias towards the near (at least when an agent does not ex-
hibit dynamic inconsistency). 
Recently at least two arguments have been put forward to dem-
onstrate that our future-bias can lead to such a violation. Caspar Hare 
noticed that we are selective in our future-biases and this can lead to 
incoherence in our attitudes.37 The fact that we are selective means 
that sometimes we have future-bias and sometimes no. For example, 
we prefer to have a very painful surgery behind us then a less pain-
ful surgery ahead. But when we evaluate what would we prefer for 
other people we do not exhibit this bias: we probably prefer a public 
health care provider to do less painful surgeries than more painful, no 
matter when. To demonstrate that this kind of selective bias can lead 
to incoherence, Hare presented the following example (I present here 
a shorter version of this story from his entry to A Companion to the 
Philosophy of Time). 
36 R. Lowry, M. Peterson, “Pure time preference”, op. cit.
37 C. Hare, “A puzzle about other-directed time-bias”, op. cit.
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I learn, by letter, that my daughter, away at a distant, monastic retreat, 
far from phones or email, was scheduled either to have her wisdom 
teeth removed under a weaker local anaesthetic on Wednesday, or to 
have her wisdom teeth removed under a stronger local anaesthetic on 
Thursday. But this time I am unsure where the letter came from. She 
is either staying in a monastery in the far-north of Japan or staying in 
a monastery in the far-south of Japan. Undeterred, my wife and I jump 
on planes – hers heading to the south, mine heading to the north. On 
early Thursday morning I arrive at the northern monastery and am 
confronted with a sleeping figure. In the dim light I cannot quite tell 
if it is my daughter, and certainly cannot tell if my daughter has had 
her operation yet. One thing I do know is this: I am significantly bet-
ter than my wife at allaying preoperative anxieties (with games, funny 
stories, etc.) and my wife is significantly better than me at providing 
post-operative comfort (with hugs, grapes, etc.).38
He noticed that our preference changes when the object (in this 
case our daughter) is close or far away. If she is close, we prefer 
she has had this operation behind her, if she is far away we evaluate 
her total well-being from a more impersonal perspective and we care 
about minimizing her suffering, no matter when it occurs (it is only 
his armchair intuition, it has not been verified behaviourally). Hare 
writes: “The majority view is that in the far-away case you should pre-
fer that she have a better life, and in the nearby case you should prefer 
that she be in a better predicament”.39 The problem is that he claims 
that in such a situation the structure of preferences would be incoher-
ent and thus irrational. Why? Let us assume that there are four pos-
sible options here. 
A.  She is near, and she has had the more painful operation.
B.  She is far, and she has had the more painful operation.
38 C. Hare, “Time – the emotional asymmetry”, in H. Dyke, A. Bardon, A Companion 
to the Philosophy of Time, Wiley, Oxford 2013, pp. 507–520.
39 C. Hare, “A puzzle about other-directed time-bias”, op. cit., p. 271.
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C.  She is near, and she will have the less painful operation.
D.  She is far, and she will have the less painful operation.
In this case Hare claims that the structure of preferences would 
be cyclical (I assume that B>A means that an agent prefers B to A): 
A>C>D>B>A. And having this kind of preferences is a clear exam-
ple of irrationality according to many authors. Of course, this exam-
ple does not show that we should get rid of future-bias because of the 
requirements of rationality. To avoid incoherency we can just become 
less selective in our future-biases. Indeed, Hare suggests that since 
you shouldn’t be selectively future-biased because of the require-
ments of rationality, you should be constantly future biased because 
of the requirements of morality. It means that in the above example 
you should prefer that you daughter has have the worse operation no 
matter whether she is near or far, because you know that this worse 
surgery has already been finished.
It seems to solve the problem of irrationality of some future-biases, 
but there is a similar argument but with a much stronger conclusion.40 It 
suggests that rationality requires not being future biased at all. Dough-
erty claims that two preferences that seem to be permissible indepen-
dently, that is future bias and risk aversion, produce an irrational prefer-
ence set when held simultaneously. He demonstrated that anyone who 
has the future bias and is risk averse can be turned into “pain pump”: he 
would accept a series of deals that guarantees he will suffer more pain 
overall and be better off in no respect. To prove this he use the follow-
ing example, a modified version of Parfit’s hospital case: 
On Monday, you are admitted into a hospital. You are told you will 
have one of two courses of operations, but you are not told which. If 
you have the early course, then you will have a painful, four-hour ope-
ration on Tuesday and a painful, one-hour operation on Thursday. If 
you have the late course, then you will have a painful, three-hour ope-
40 T. Dougherty, “On whether to prefer pain to pass”, Ethics 121(3) (2011), pp. 521–
537.
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ration on Thursday. After any operation, you will have amnesia for se-
veral days, and so you will not be able to remember if you have just 
had an operation. There is a calendar next to your bed, and so you al-
ways know what day it is.41
Dougherty proposes that on Monday you will be offered a deal 
that will take 29 minutes of pain off the Thursday operation if you are 
on the early course, and add 31 minutes to the Thursday operation if 
you are on the late course. And, either way, on Wednesday you will 
be offered a deal that will add 30 minutes to the Thursday operation 
if you are on the early course, and take 30 minutes off the Thursday 
operation if you are on the late course. Your decision on Monday will 
have no causal influence over your decision on Wednesday. 
What happens if you are future-biased and risk averse? On Mon-
day you accept the offer, because you want to “insure” yourself 
against the worst expected outcome: you are ready to add one minute 
of pain to the better course to reduce pain by one minute in the worse 
outcome. But on Wednesday you are also ready to accept the offer. 
Accepting it does not affect your expected amount of pain but it again 
reduces the risk you face: it reduces the gap between the bad out-
come and the good outcome. Moreover, in this case this “insurance” 
is also for free from the perspective of expected utility. But if you take 
both pills you can be sure to have one minute more pain on Thursday 
and gain nothing: you become “a pain pump”, you can be easily ex-
ploited (in terms of pain) without any compensation (if you had the 
early course you took off 29 minutes of pain on Monday, but added 
30 minutes on Wednesday; if you had the late course you added 31 
minutes on Monday, but added 30 minutes on Wednesday). In effect, 
Dougherty claims that we have four possible options in cases like this: 
(1) We could deny that you are rationally forbidden from having pref-
erences that allow you to be turned into a pain pump. Alternatively, we 
41 Ibidem, p. 526.
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could deny that you are permitted to be time-biased and risk averse. 
Notice that there are several ways in which we could deny this: (2) 
we could claim that separately time-bias and risk aversion are ration-
ally permissible but the combination of the two is impermissible, (3) 
we could deny that risk aversion is rationally permissible, or (4) we 
could deny that time bias is rationally permissible.42
He suggests that the fourth option is probably the best, although 
at first glance it seems counterintuitive: it requires that you are indif-
ferent as to whether you have already experienced strong pain or you 
are about to experience it.43 
4.2. Time-biases and rationality as reason responsiveness
There is also a second dimension in which our time-biases can be ir-
rational. This type of criticism is applied to the bias toward the near. 
Some philosophers claim that there exist objective and external facts 
about the correctness of time-biases and responding to these facts 
would be a requirement of rationality.44 On this view some beliefs and 
intentions are intrinsically irrational. There are some beliefs and in-
tentions such that even if an agent is internally consistent, he or she: 
is nevertheless making a normative mistake in the sense that he or she 
is valuing something that is not in fact valuable, or desiring something 
that is not in fact desirable. To put the view in reasons terminology, 
there are facts about how an agent has the most normative reason to 
live that hold independently of that agent’s evaluative attitudes and 
what follows from within the standpoint constituted by them; instead, 
an agent’s normative reasons are always ultimately a function of that 
agent’s own evaluative attitudes and what is logically or instrumen-
42 Ibidem, p. 533.
43 See also: P. Greene, M. Sullivan, “Against Time Bias”, Ethics 125(4) (2015), pp. 
947–970.
44 D. Parfit, On what matters, vol. 1, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011.
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tally entailed by those attitudes in combination with the non-norma-
tive facts.45 
The important point here is that rationality must require much 
more than mere coherence between attitudes. It must also require that 
an agent responds properly to some reasons or at least to apparent rea-
sons.46
There are at least two main problems with such an understanding. 
First of all the understanding rationality as responsiveness to reasons 
is controversial. I have argued elsewhere that Parfit’s views in this 
matter lead to problematic conclusion: he does not have the tools to 
distinguish truth from rationality in the case of normative beliefs, so 
he must assume that every normative belief that is rational must also 
be true. This is contrary to the case of non-normative beliefs when it 
is quite usual that a rational belief does not have to be a true belief, 
for example because we do not know – without our fault – some im-
portant piece of information. In the case of normative beliefs it is not 
possible, leading to awkward results.47 
Secondly, the claim that time-biases are irrational in this sense 
is based on a conception that overlooks a distinction between prefer-
ences that are rationally required and preferences that are rationally 
permitted. The standard argument that time-biases are irrational can 
be summarized as follows: 
(i) Rationality implies an impartial concern for all parts of one’s life. 
(ii) A preference for something which is based merely on a difference 
of location in time is a preference which is not based on an impartial 
concern for all parts of one’s life.
45 S. Street, “In defense of future Tuesday...”, op. cit.
46 D. Parfit, “Rationality and reasons”, in D. Egonsson, J. Josefsson, B. Petersson, T. 
Rønnow-Rasmussen, Exploring practical philosophy: From action to values, Ashgate, 
London 2001, pp. 17–39.
47 T. Żuradzki, Internalizm i eksternalizm w metaetyce, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu 
Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2012; T. Żuradzki, “Trzeci rodzaj normatywności – wymóg 
reagowania na racje”, Filozofia Nauki 88(4) (2014), pp. 35–51.
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(iii) A preference which is based merely on a difference of location in 
time is irrational.48
Lowry and Peterson target the first point: they argue that some-
times rationality allows time-biases and therefore it does not require 
that everyone must have an impartial concern for his or her life. They 
consider ways in which a preference can be irrational. Apart from 
the mere incoherence that I have discussed above there are two other 
ways. Firstly, because a preference conflicts with the other prefer-
ences that agent can have, and secondly, because it is arbitrary. Now 
I will discuss shortly these two ways and I will demonstrate that there 
can be time-biases that are rationally permissible. 
The first reason why time-biases are called irrational can be the 
fact that a time-biased preference can conflict with the other prefer-
ences that an agent can have. For example Rawls discusses the case 
of a blade-of-grass counter, whose only preference is “to count blades 
of grass in various geometrically shaped areas such as park squares 
and well-trimmed lawns”.49 Rawls does not call his preference irra-
tional. He assumes that there are many other activities (from cycling 
to studying philosophy) that make our life better than grass counting, 
but there is nothing intrinsically irrational in having a preference of 
counting blades of grass. 
Nevertheless, according to Parfit’s view, there are reasons to 
make other things that compete with the preference to count blades 
of grass and these other preferences should prevail if an agent is ra-
tional (that is reacts correctly to his or her reasons). In other words, 
a rational agent should have a proper “mechanism” that helps him to 
recognize and respond properly to the strength of reasons. . 
The case of time-biases is similar: Parfit does not claim that time-
biases are irrational as such, but only that they conflict with other rea-
sons. It is worth noting that for Parfit there are no direct reasons not to 
48 R. Lowry, M. Peterson, “Pure time preference”, op. cit., p. 492.
49 J. Rawls, A theory of justice, op. cit.
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be time-biased. All of Parfit’s examples are designed to demonstrate 
only that it is wrong to be time-biased because of some other pruden-
tial reasons. For example: Parfit would claim that if someone had a 
belief that some dish would damage his health, this belief would make 
the desire to eat this dish irrational, because this desire would respond 
to objectively existing reasons in an inappropriate way. He claims that 
it is always irrational for me to act in a way that I know will be worse 
for me. The case of time-biases is different: they are irrational because 
they conflict with stronger prudential reasons.
The second reason why time-biases seem to be irrational is their 
arbitrariness.50 A preference is arbitrary, when there are no reasons 
to have it (but also there are no reasons not to have it). For example, 
Parfit writes: 
It is irrational to care less about future pains because they will be felt 
either on a Tuesday, or more than a year in the future… In these cases 
the concern is not less because of some intrinsic difference in the ob-
ject of concern. The concern is less because of a property which is 
purely positional, and which draws an arbitrary line. These are the pat-
terns of concern that are, in the clearest way, irrational.51 
He claims that a preference is arbitrary when it does not re-
flect some intrinsic differences in objects of concern but is based on 
“purely positional property”. What is wrong in these purely positional 
preferences? I will assume that he mistakenly claims that when a pref-
erence is based on a neutral basis then it must be irrational. A neu-
tral basis means that there no reasons in favour and against this pref-
erence. Similar reasoning could be found in the above citations from 
Sidgwick52 and Rawls53 who write about “a reasonable ground” or “a 
rational ground”. 
50 P. Greene, M. Sullivan, “Against Time Bias”, op. cit., p. 950,
51 D. Parfit, Reasons and persons, op. cit., pp  125–126.
52 H. Sidgwick, The methods of ethics, op. cit., III, 13. 3.
53 J. Rawls, A theory of justice, op. cit., p. 259.
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Let me distinguish three possible ways in which preferences can 
be grounded.54 Firstly it can be grounded on some good reasons: for 
example I prefer to eat a dish because I believe that it is healthy. 
Secondly, it can be grounded on some bad reasons: I prefer to eat 
it because I believe that it is poisonous. Thirdly a preference can be 
grounded on a neutral basis. Here is an example: I live in a city where 
there are two concert halls and I would like to listen to music this 
evening. In one of the concert halls, Beethoven will be played, in the 
other, Schumann. I believe that both concerts will be equally pleasur-
able, and I value Schumann as much as Beethoven. I do not have any 
reasonably grounds to prefer one concert over the other, but I must de-
cide. So I finally decide to listen to Schumann. Is my decision, which 
is based on neutral grounds, necessarily irrational? I believe that this 
case is similar to the case of some time-biases. For example, let us 
imagine that the decision concerns not to which should concert I go, 
but when. Should I listen to Schumann today or tomorrow? Again 
I do not have any relevant preferences in this matter, and experiencing 
the concert gives me a fixed number of units of intrinsic value when-
ever I go, so you have no rational grounds for preferring to go on a 
particular occasion. But I must decide and finally I decide to go today. 
I decide only because of the pure time preference: I just prefer to have 
a pleasurable experience earlier than later. I do not see why (as Parfit 
claims) this kind of preference which is purely positional must be ir-
rational. It is not a preference similar to the preference of this kind: 
“I prefer to eat because I believe that it is poisonous”. And I also as-
sume that there are no other stronger reasons to do something else 
(like in the example of blade-of-grass counter).
It seems that the problem with Parfit’s solution is that he assumes 
that to have a rational preference we must have a good reason to have 
it. Therefore he does not distinguish between the preferences that are 
required from the preferences that are merely permitted. And a pref-
erence that is based on time-bias can sometimes be a rationally per-
54 R. Lowry, M. Peterson, “Pure time preference”, op. cit.
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mitted preference. For example: the fact that I prefer to listen to mu-
sic something rather earlier than later only because I have a pure time 
preference is not irrational itself. It can become irrational if there are 
some reasons against my earlier listening. 
Parfit’s tough position on the irrationality of time-biases can 
be partially explained by his reason externalism.55 This position 
(he calls it “value-based theory of practical reasons” in contrast to 
“desire-based theories”) claims that normative reasons for actions 
are all “provided by facts about what is relevantly good, or worth 
achieving.”56 If we add that Parfit assumes that time when an action 
is realized is not “relevantly good” and that he claims that rationality 
requires that we respond correctly to normative reasons for actions, 
we obtain the result that we are irrational when we are time-biased. 
In contrast, according to internalist view an agent has a reason for 
action if and only if that action is related to agent’s “subjective mo-
tivational set” in a particular way. It must be the case that “A could 
reach the conclusion that he should φ… by a sound deliberative route 
from the motivations that he has in his actual motivational set – that 
is, the set of his desires, evaluations, attitudes, projects, and so on.”57 
If normative reasons for action are related to an agents subjective 
motivational set it is much easier to justify time-biased preferences. 
An agent who has this kind preference can be perfectly rational, be-
cause the rationality of his desires depends (at least partially) on his 
own motivational set. 
There are two main conclusions to this section. Firstly, there are 
good arguments that the bias toward the future is irrational in a very 
strong sense: it violates the requirement of rationality as coherence. 
It is a surprising conclusion since at first sight it might have seemed 
that this bias is less problematic than the bias toward the near. Sec-
ondly, arguments against the rationality of time preferences are more 
55 S. Street, “In defense of future Tuesday...”, op. cit.
56 D. Parfit, “Rationality and reasons”, op. cit.
57 B.A.O. Williams,  “Internal and external reasons”, in Moral Luck, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge 1981, pp. 101–113.
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problematic, because they must assume that a preference that is not 
grounded on some objective reasons is irrational, and that there are 
no rational preferences based on neutral grounds. 
5. Time-biases and the emergence of normative orders
The article is intended to help understand how the present day nor-
mative orders (i.e. popular moral judgments, legal and economic reg-
ulations) have emerged in the context of different forms of the time-
biased preferences of individuals. Policy makers very often treat 
time-biases on the individual level as a one of main reasons to jus-
tify discounting future benefits and losses (that is to place a lower 
value on a future gain or loss than on the same gain or loss occur-
ring now). The other justification for discounting is the productiv-
ity of capital (evaluating some project we should take into consid-
eration that instead we can invest our money and have more money 
in future). The standard argument for the justification of discounting 
based on the preferences of individuals is the following. Firstly, pol-
icies in democratic societies should reflect the well-established pref-
erences of individuals. For example, the first sentence of a review ar-
ticle about discounting says: “Prescriptive economics requires that, 
unless there are very good reasons to the contrary, economic policy 
should be based on the principle that individuals’ preferences should 
count”.58 Secondly, empirical research unambiguously shows that 
people tend to care more about the present than about the future and 
this phenomenon concerns many different values (money, health, 
lives etc.). So if this behaviour reflects what people prefer, then dis-
counting is required. These time-biases are visible in many norma-
tive orders: major infrastructure programs, health care programmes, 
environmental protection and actions against climate change, energy 
58 D. Pearce, B. Groom, C. Hepburn, P. Koundouri, “Valuing the future”, World Econo-
mics 4(2) (2003), pp. 121–141.
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policies. For example, an European Union guide for a long term in-
vestment program claims: 
Costs and benefits occurring at different times must be discounted. 
The discount rate in the economic analysis of investment projects the 
social discount rate (SDR) reflects the social view on how future be-
nefits and costs should be valued against present ones. It may differ 
from the financial discount rate when the capital market is inefficient 
(for example when there is credit rationing, asymmetric information 
and myopia of savers and investors, etc.).
The EU commission assumes that costs and benefits must be 
discounted and that the discount rate reflects the social view what 
can be understood as the aggregation of an individual’s preferences. 
The EU commission also assumes that the social discount rate can 
differ from the financial discount rate only when market is ineffi-
cient. Unfortunately, it does not propose any method in which it 
should be counted. 
Publicly funded healthcare systems provide one of the most vis-
ible and ethically intriguing aspect of discounting. For example, a re-
cently published study by WHO Assessing health needs: the Global 
Burden of Disease Study claims:
Individuals commonly discount future benefits against current bene-
fits similarly to the way that they may discount future dollars against 
current dollars. Whether a year of healthy life, like a dollar, is also 
deemed to be preferable now rather than later, is a matter of debate 
among economists, medical ethicists, and public health planners, 
since discounting future health affects both measurements of disease 
burden and estimates of the cost-effectiveness of an intervention.59 
59 C.J.L. Murray, A.D. Lopez, C.D. Mathers, Assessing health needs: The global bur-
den of disease approach, Oxford University Press, New York 2006.
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The study mentions that the most visible effect of discounting is 
the value of health interventions that provide benefits largely in the 
future, for example “vaccinating against hepatitis B, which may pre-
vent thousands of cases of liver cancer, but some decades later.” The 
question is how should we compare the cost of these interventions 
with others that can prevent or treat present day illness. For exam-
ple, the cited WHO study notices that if future life years were dis-
counted by 3 per cent per year, this would mean that a year of healthy 
life bought for 10 years hence is worth around 24 per cent less than 
one bought for now. It would also mean that we state that 1 life saved 
today is equivalent to saving 19.2 lives in 100 years. So the discount 
rate is a crucial parameter inhealthcare analyses , it is often employed 
arbitrarily.
At first glance the discount rate, especially when concerns the 
value of health of future people, seems not to have any moral justi-
fication. Why should policy makers value the present health of the 
population more than the health of the population in five years time? 
On the one hand, it seems that the value of health in these two cases 
should be the same. On the other, if we get rid of discount rates, we 
shortly reach very counterintuitive results. 
For example, it was seriously argued that publicly funded health-
care systems should not pay for patented treatments and wait until 
their protection expires, even if it would mean the death of many pre-
sent people who could be rescued by these drugs.60 The author of this 
proposition assumes, firstly, that it is better to “save the greater num-
ber in cases where all are equally deserving and we cannot save both 
groups”61; and secondly, that it would be wrong to apply a discount 
rate to future health benefits. He claims that “there is no justification 
for thinking that the time at which a medical need occurs should make 
60 J. Wilson, “Paying for patented drugs is hard to justify: an argument about time 
discounting and medical need”, Journal of Applied Philosophy 29(3) (2012), pp. 
186–199.
61 Ibidem, p. 186.
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a difference to its moral weight”.62 Therefore, since we can reasona-
bly expect that future lifesaving will be cheaper than present lifesav-
ing (for example because patents will expire), we should concentrate 
solely on the number of saved people, and not on the time when they 
are saved. A similar line of argumentation was presented (but as a re-
ductio ad absurdum of the views that opposes using a discount rate to 
future health benefits) with regard to delaying aid intended to prevent 
relatively easily preventable death in the developing world.63 The au-
thor claims that if we assumed strict neutrality between the present 
and future interests of people, there would never be sufficient reasons 
to rescue present people (for example, by humanitarian aid), because 
it would be always more efficient to invest money and save more peo-
ple in the future. 
One of the most controversial and discussed examples of the use 
discount rate is energy policy and mitigating human induced climate 
change. For example, the Stern Review estimated that “if we don’t 
act, the overall costs and risks of climate change will be equivalent 
to losing at least 5% of global GDP each year, now and forever. If a 
wider range of risks and impacts is taken into account, the estimates 
of damage could rise to 20% of GDP or more”.64 Many economists 
were surprised by the scale of this prediction since it was dramatically 
different from earlier economic models. The main factor that under-
lies these very high estimates was a discount rate which is at the heart 
of the Review’s radical view of the damages from climate change. 
The review assumed – because of moral reasons – an extremely low 
discount rate and that future losses should be valued almost as much 
as present. The result was that we should now spend about 1 % of 
global GDP (500 billion USD) annually to fight global warming. Al-
though the Stern Review was a serious report prepared for the British 
62 Ibidem, p. 187.
63 D. Moller, “Should we let people starve–for now?”, Analysis 66(291) (2006), pp. 
240–247.
64 N.N.H. Stern,  The economics of climate change: the Stern review, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2007.
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government, some economists treated this scale of expenditures as a 
reductio ad absurdum of the views that oppose using a discount rate 
to evaluate future environmental harms.65
The conclusion of this section is that it is relatively easy to under-
stand the way in which present day normative orders have emerged in 
the context of individual time-preferences. The social discounting can 
be understood as an expansion of individual preferences. The standard 
model says that individuals have clear time-biased preferences, and so-
cietal value is maximised when aggregating these personal preferences 
within a community. The much harder question is how to evaluate these 
propositions which suggest that policies should not discount future val-
ues (e.g. the health or well-being of future population). To evaluate 
these views we have to take into account not only whether these indi-
vidual time-biased preferences are rational but also many other prob-
lems. For example, there are probably differences in individual time-
biased preferences between our own life and society as well as between 
intraand intergenerational distributions. Perhaps we have many differ-
ent sets of time-biased preferences: one that reflects individuals’ pref-
erences for their own wellbeing extended in time, a second where in-
dividuals take social and intergenerational considerations into account. 
Some authors assume that if these time-biased preferences turn out to 
be irrational (or incorrect, or immoral), there would be “no more reason 
that public policy should reflect people’s inability to weight time neu-
trally than that it should reflect people’s incapacity to think rationally 
about large numbers or perform fancy arithmetic.”66 But this answer 
is too quick: I have demonstrated that time-biased preferences are not 
similar to myopic failures (like people’s incapacity to think rationally 
about large numbers). Even if there were, there would still be a prob-
lem of paternalism: if adult citizens care less about the further future, 
are policy makers allowed to force people to care more? 
65 P. Dasgupta, “Discounting climate change”, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 37(2-3) 
(2008), pp. 141–169.
66 R.E. Goodin, “Discounting discounting”, Journal of Public Policy 2(1) (1982), pp. 
53–71.
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6. Conclusions
I have demonstrated that time-biases (or at least many of them) are 
very specific preferences and they do not belong to any standard cat-
egory of obvious preference failures discovered recently by experi-
mental psychology or economy. This is why it is not easy to settle the 
matter of their rationality. On the one hand, I have reached a surpris-
ing conclusion that the bias toward the future (together with a non-
controversial premise that we are risk averse) violates the requirement 
of the transitivity of our value preferences, and therefore this type of 
time-bias seems to be irrational. On the other, I have argued that the 
standard arguments against rationality of the bias toward the near are 
surprisingly weak. I have also noticed that some arguments 
against time-biases are based on armchair intuitions about 
people’s reactions that have not been checked as yet empirically. 
This is an important task since, as research on time-biases shows, 
empirical investigations can often inform normative analyses.
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